Introduction
Over the course of the next few posts, my blog will be covering a range issues, including, but not limited to:
- the advantages associated with using the PSR as a theoretical foundation for idealism,
- the question of what precisely it means to say that “Matter is the visibility for Mind,” (and the implications associated with this view)
- the exact nature of “Pure Mind,” within the context of this system (beyond merely its definition as a function of the negation of subjective self-objectification)
- the question of what precisely it means to say that “Mind is reality experienced in (unindividuated) Time alone,”
In this post, I will be covering topic 2.
Explanation
Behind the phrase “Matter is the visibility for Mind,” there are two meanings. The first meaning is explicit, the second meaning is implicit.
The explicit meaning is this: “Matter is just the appearance by which Mind makes sense of Reality.” In other words, the explicit meaning refers to the fact that the everyday observable world is nothing more than a representational appearance of the underlying substratum of reality as it exists in-itself.
The implicit meaning is this: “Matter is an appearance of an underlying Reality.” In other words, the implicit meaning refers to the underlying substratum of reality in-itself for which Matter is but a representation.
Put simply: the explicit meaning refers to Matter as the appearance for Mind, while the implicit meaning refers to Matter as the appearance of Pure Mind.
This is demonstrated in the updated version of my ontological diagram, as you can see below.
Implications
Material Reality = PErception
Material reality, the material world, the apparent world is reducible to conscious perception.
In other words: the apparent world is real because of perception.
Material Reality is Exactly How It Appears to Be
The “apparent world,” is exactly as it appears to be, because there is nothing in the “apparent world,” which exists outside of it being an object of appearance. All that there is to the world is the appearance it has for us, therefore there can be no possible discrepancy between it and our perception of it, since all “it” is, is but an appearance for us. Whatever is perceived in it, is, by definition, really true of it.
The material world can be divided into two types of properties: 1. quantitative and 2. qualitative. Both are fundamentally perceptual. More specifically, these two types of properties, respectively, exhibit the properties of relativity and privacy. Relativity and privacy, together, constitute the reason for why “Matter/the apparent world” is exactly how it appears to be–because, there is nothing to “Matter/the apparent world” other than the appearance it has to the observer which witnesses it from his relative and private point of view.
Quantitative properties are made in reference to mathematical abstractions of Space and Time quantities. For instance, quantities like speed are just expressions of distance over time, mass is an expression of gravitational forces which are themselves distortions in Space-Time, force is a function of mass and speed, etc.. Ultimately, the supposedly mind-independent quantitative properties of the Universe, are still ultimately mental abstractions made in reference to Space-Time, which are themselves constructs of perception. This point is especially evident when we take into consideration the innate relativity of Space-Time calculations, as corroborated in Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity. In other words, the quantitative properties of the Universe are only intelligible in reference to the relative point of view of an observer.
Qualitative properties like texture, colour, taste, sound, etc. on the other hand, are irreducible other than in self-referential appeal to the consciousness which experiences those things. That is, there is no further explanation for the experience of the colour blue other than that “I experience the colour blue.” In other words, qualitative properties are fundamentally private and incommunicable. When I point at an apple and say “this apple is red,” I will never be able to confirm that the red I see, is the same red that my friend sees. For all I know, my red could be someone else’s blue.
All that there is to the material world is quantitative and qualitative properties, and all that there is to these properties is their conscious perception, namely their relative and private conscious perception. The implication of this is obvious. There are as many apparent worlds as their are conscious perceivers with their own relative and private consciousness. This is shown in my diagram, with each possible “Mind,” corresponding to each possible “Matter.”
Contrast this viewpoint with that of Materialism, which suggest that the “real material world independent of our minds,” is not at all how it appears to us. Materialism suggests that Matter is not just appearance, so therefore there is a form of Matter that exists independent of its appearance. This form of matter would, by definition, not possess any qualitative properties, and it couldn’t possess any relative quantities (because relativity implies conscious observation). This mind-independent matter would also have a definitive public, rather than private, face (of course, what this would look like would be impossible to know by definition, because nothing can be perceived other than through the filter of private qualia).
This supposedly mind-independent form of matter would just be a non-relative, qualia-less Monad. But wait, does this idea of a mind-independent Monad make sense in-and-of-itself, or does it require reference to the Mind in order to make sense? That is to say, the notion of this mind-independent Monad only seems to make sense in contradistinction to the mind-dependent world of Matter. Therefore, the Monad still presupposes the existence of a Mind. The Monad is not mind-independent at all, because it is a metaphysical entity which only makes sense in reference to the Mind of which it is a supposed negation. Therefore, the conception of a Monad is only intelligible as a mental abstraction. That is, Monad is not a mind-independent reality, as much as it is the end result of a Mind which abstracts away relativity and privacy from Matter. This is illustrated by my diagram.
Objections
What About Illusions?
Take for instance, the illusion of the stick which appears to be bent when submerged partly in water, but which, when felt, is not actually bent. According to perception (Tactile sensation, and sight sensation), the stick exhibits two inconstant properties: 1. to the sight it appears bent, and 2. to the touch it appears not-bent.
Does this not constitute a problem for idealism? It would seem like the inconsistency between a perceived property, implies a failure of perception to correctly apprehend the world.
No. I have various possible responses to this line of questioning, but for the sake of convenience I will focus only on two:
- The assumption that an inconsistently perceived property implies a failure to “correctly” apprehend the world, presupposes that there is a standard of “correctness” independent of perception (i.e., there is a “correct” world independent of perception). But this is precisely what I am arguing against. There is no such mind-independent world. If the world is just perception, then inconsistently perceived properties are not bugs but features of the world.
- Why should inconsistently perceived properties suggest a problem at all? Different senses consistently contradict one another, and yet no one makes a problem out of that. When I see a red book, and I reach out to touch it, is it a problem that my hands cannot feel the colour red which I see with my eyes? Is it a problem that if I were to lick that book, I could not taste the colour red? If I were to put my ear to it, I could not hear the colour red–would that be a problem? Sensorial discrepancies are innate to the senses, because the senses correspond to distinct styles of qualia (i.e., distinct forms of perceptual information–touch, taste, sight, sound, etc.). Property discrepancies are a built-in mechanism of the distinct senses.
Ultimately, different senses may each correspond to distinct perceptions, but that does not make any of the perceptions any less true. That the observable world exhibits inconsistency is but a feature of world.
What About Hallucinations and/or Delusions?
Maybe the “apparent world” does exhibit inconsistency from the standpoint of a given observer. But what about inconsistency between any two given observers? What if one observer perceives the existence of an object which another observer does not perceive?
Both perspectives are true, relative to their respective perceivers.
A perception that is commonly shared may just be called a reality; whereas a highly idiosyncratic perception may be designated a delusion or hallucination. Regardless, both are fundamentally true insofar as both are true perceptions that are being consciously experienced by their respective experiencers.
Consensus does not make reality, perception does. Consensus simply differentiates common reality from unique reality.
What about Existences Beyond Immediate Perception?
If all that there is to the “apparent world” is its appearance for some perceiver, then what happens when that perceiver stops perceiving. Does the perceived object cease to exist? Do things cease to exist when we no longer perceive them?
The answer to this question is already implied in the PSR. Since perception is isomorphic to the PSR, the perception of any given thing already presupposes the sufficient reasons for which that thing is possible. The sufficient reasons for the possibility of any given thing, in turn, will always attach itself to the reality of objects which are not necessarily in one’s immediate field of perception.
Concordantly, the reality of things which are not immediately within one’s field of perception is implied in the perception of things which are, via the power of the PSR.
For instance, the perception of my parent’s existence, presupposes the perception of their biological source of origin–their parents/my grandparents. Therefore, I don’t have to perceive my grandparents to know they are real (either in the present or in the past), because the very perception of my parents presupposes their reality.
In conclusion: something which does not exist within my immediate field of perception, is nevertheless perceived implicitly, via the things which are within my immediate field of perception ( via the power of PSR). Therefore, perception is still the precondition of all apparent reality.
What About Continuity?
Similarly, we can argue about the continuation of the existences of things beyond my immediate scope of perception.
Imagine a movie which is left running while I go to the bathroom. When I return, the movie will have continued up until the point that I return for me to perceive it immediately. This indicates that the movie has an existence independent of my immediate perception.
This implication is true, but this doesn’t contradict my claim that perception (immediate or otherwise) is the precondition of the “apparent world.”
The “apparent world,” continues to operate in the background independent of my immediate perception, but not entirely independent of all perception.
The continuity of the world, is implied in the perception of Time, and Time is a nomological condition of all perceptions. Just because something is not immediately perceived at every given moment, does not mean that Time does not operate in the background as the condition by which all other perceptions are rendered possible.
In other words, Time is a construct by which the world is rendered intelligible. Therefore, Time being a construct of perception, continuity is nothing more than a construct of the mind.
Essentially what I am trying to say is this: what we perceive as continuity is exactly just that–a perception.
That the world appears to exist independent of our immediate perception, is itself only possible because of the perceptions (mental constructs) of Space and Time, which create an automatic world of intelligible continuity available for perception.
What about when You Go to Sleep?
This question is a continuation of the “continuity objection.”
The basic premise behind this question is thus: when you go to sleep, you supposedly disassociate from the Mind-Matter-Monad process and reintegrate back into Pure Mind. If this is so, it would seem like you would be suspending the PSR, and entering a realm where the Time, Space, Causality and Individuation no longer apply. The metaphysical theory of idealism may very well explain the phenomenon of “dreaming,” but it doesn’t account for how the world seems to continue to work independently of our perception of it.
When you’re sleeping, you don’t even have an immediate perception of anything in the material world. So how is it that after dreaming for a while, you can wake up in a world that seems to have operated for the amount of time you were gone dreaming, independent of your conscious perception? Does this not imply that the world truly exists independent of your perception of it?
The answer to these questions are simple: just like “Pure Mind,”/awareness-in-itself arbitrarily folds into itself and becomes “Mind”/awareness-of-itself, so too do our Minds arbitrarily fall in and out of self-aware consciousness in cycles of waking and sleeping.
When “Pure Mind,” folds in on itself and becomes “Mind,” the apparent world of “Matter” is instantaneously constructed in a self-consistent manner across all Space-Time. From the beginning of the Universe, to the end of the Universe, every single aspect of the causal Timeline is already Written out in conformity to the PSR.
Hence, though Pure Mind is in-itself beyond the PSR, it clearly contains the potentiality from which the PSR ultimately derives. Therefore, when a Mind goes to sleep and reintegrates (partly at least, not necessarily fully) with Pure Mind, it forgets about the PSR from its point of view. When it wakes up, it resumes the operation of the PSR from the standpoint of a Space-Time point from which it would continue to be self-consistent. That is, the Mind retroactively constructs a Space-Time narrative such that in the absence of consciousness during sleep, the Mind can tell itself “the world operated independent of my perception for those 8 hours.”
In other words, what we call “waking up,” is just a construct of retroactive assignments of a duration of Time attributed to a period which is represented in our introspective consciousnesses by a lapse of self-aware consciousness. In other words, we only know we were asleep at all because we “woke up.”
The continuity of the world’s operations when we were asleep for those 8 hours, is a retroactive perception and/or a retroactive application of the PSR. Therefore, the apparent world is still not independent of perception.
Conclusion
In this post we covered, the explicit and implicit meanings behind the phrase “Matter is the visibility for Mind.” I elaborated on the metaphysical implications of these two meanings, and responded to a few objections which I anticipated would be used against my worldview.
In the next post we will continue to expand on the topics discussed here. Specifically, I intend to have a discussion on the scientific utility of Idealism, its intersection with the strong anthropic principle, and the implications it has in reconfiguring our scientific understanding of the process of the evolution of the cosmos, life and consciousness.
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