A Proof of Idealism

Premise 1: There is a Foundational Problem in Philosophy

The Hierarchy of Knowledge

Introductory Definitions

The Purpose of the Hierachy of Knowledge

The purpose of the hierarchy of knowledge is to provide structure to the content of truth, and our knowledge of it.

That is to say, we must be able to prioritize which information is fundamental and which information is accessory to the fundamental.

For instance, how could we ever say what is good or evil (Ethics) unless we first are able to make an argument for what is pure and simple (Metaphysics). In order to construct a theory of what is good or evil, we must first construct a theory of what is in the first place!

Same with politics. How can we arrive at a conception of a good political ideology or a bad political ideology unless we first have a conception of what good and evil even are. Politics presupposes ethics, and ethics presupposes metaphysics. Therefore, even the most concrete and applicable knowledge to our daily lives–politics–is just an extension of the most abstract and remote knowledge–metaphysics.

The metaphysics-Epistemology Entanglement problem

By definition, “Metaphysics” concerns itself over what is. By “what is,” we specifically mean what truly is. Therefore, “metaphysics,” by definition, concerns itself with certain truth.

“What is true” is “what is” and “what is” is “what is true.”

(A simple way to refer to “what is true”/”what is,” is by referring to it by the name of “Being“).

However, this seems to present us with a problem.

What we claim to be “what is true,” (Being) cannot exist independently of our knowledge of it being so. That is to say, there is no possible way of constructing a theory of metaphysics (i.e., a theory of absolute truth), without presupposing a particular epistemology via which we construct such a theory.

Therefore, “what is,” (Being) presupposes our knowledge of it being that way.

Perhaps in light of this revelation we may be compelled to argue that epistemology, not metaphysics, is the real foundation of the hierarchy of knowledge. After all, nothing can be known other than through knowledge itself, and knowledge itself is precisely the subject matter of epistemology.

However, this presents us with a new difficulty: how can we claim a particular epistemology to be the correct epistemology (i.e., the definitive epistemology through which we can arrive at true knowledge of the world) unless we have presupposed that the structure of world operates in such a way as to be compatible with the epistemology we have chosen. That is, if we assume one particular epistemology to be the definitive foundation of our knowledge of the world, we will have presupposed the the metaphysical ontic structure of the world is compatible with such an epistemology. Therefore, epistemology presupposes what is (Being).

If we step back from this analysis we arrive at a startling conclusion: metaphysics presupposes epistemology and epistemology presupposes metaphysics.

There seems to be no foundational path toward certain truth which does not present us with the metaphysics-epistemology entanglement problem.

It seems that fundamentally, philosophy is incapable of divorcing Being from Knowledge and Knowledge from Being.

premise 2: There Are Only Two Logical Alternative Solutions to this Foundational Problem

The metaphysics-epistemology entanglement problem leaves us with only two possible logical alternatives:

1. Either metaphysics and epistemology are truly one unified entity, such that Being is Knowledge and Knowledge is Being,
2. Or metaphysics and epistemology are truly not one unified entity, such that Being is not Knowledge and Knowledge is not Being.

Alternative 1: Idealism

Idealism can be defined as the philosophical position that Being is (in some way) isomorphic to Consciousness.

Insofar as alternative 1 collapses the distinction between Being and Knowledge (itself an application of consciousness), alternative 1 can be properly classified as a form of idealism.

Explanation: If alternative 1 is correct, then Being and Knowledge are one. Knowledge is a form of consciousness, therefore Being is just a form of consciousness.

Alternative 2: Absurdism

Absurdism is defined as the position that the world is fundamentally absurd, (i.e., unintelligible and/or undecipherable, utterly incomprehensible and impenetrable to human reasoning).

Insofar as alternative 2 maintains the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology, it endorses a position of absurdism, insofar as we are incapable getting around the entanglement problem. In other words, if alternative 2 is correct, then entanglement is a problem we have to get past, but we cannot, therefore we cannot make any progress in philosophy and the world is fundamentally undecipherable to us–we cannot known anything with certainty.

Explanation: If alternative 2 is correct, then this seems to suggest that philosophy is utterly defunct. Why? Because if Being and Knowledge are not truly one, then they are independent things. Independent things cannot presuppose one another and/or are not entangled, and yet it seems like our philosophical process necessarily leads us to a process of presupposition/entanglement between metaphysics and epistemology. Therefore, assuming alternative 2 is correct, the world is forever undecipherable to us. As long as we assume alternative 2 is true, then the world is ultimately unintelligible to us, because we cannot even construct a foundation for any subsequent knowledge, whether that foundation be epistemological or metaphysical. Alternative 2, therefore, can only lead us to one conclusion: absurdism, the position that the world is fundamentally unintelligible and undecipherable.

premise 3: Only Alternative 1 is Sound

Alternative 2 is the position of absurdism (i.e., the position that the world is fundamentally unintelligible and/or undecipherable).

This position, however, by definition, is self-contradictory.

If absurdism states that the world is unintelligible and/or undecipherable that presents us with a contradiction, because the very statement that the world if “unintelligible and/or undecipherable,” is itself an intelligible and/or decipherable statement.

In other words, absurdism is the position which states that we cannot say anything true of the world because of how utterly unintelligible it is. Yet is this statement that “we cannot say anything true of the world,” not itself a supposedly true statement/description of the world?

Absurdism necessarily contradicts itself. Absurdism rejects all possible certain knowledge, except for the certain knowledge that all possible certain knowledge is itself rejected.

Absurdism presents its own reductio ad absurdum, i.e., absurdism is itself an absurdity.

Therefore, the only reasonable (i.e., non-absurd/non-self-contradictory) alternative is alternative 1. Therefore Idealism alone is the true foundation of the world.

In fact, because Idealism is the only reasonable alternative between the two (the only other alternative literally being a self-contradiction) we can even argue that Idealism is tautological.

A Summary of the Argument

Premise 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology presuppose each other (i.e., they are conceptually entangled/not independent from one another). [Axiom 1]

Premise 2: No possible knowledge of the world exists other than within the context of this entanglement. [Axiom 2]

Premise 3: Things which are entangled are ontologically non-distinct from each other. [Axiom 3]

Premise 4: Idealism is a philosophical theory which asserts that Being and Consciousness are ontologically non-distinct from each other. [Definition]

Premise 5: Metaphysics’ object of study is Being. Epistemology’s object of study is Knowledge (a form of consciousness). [Definition]

Premise 6: To say that Metaphysics and Epistemology are entangled is synonymous with saying that their respective objects of study are also entangled. [Assumption]

Premise 7: Either Metaphysics and Epistemology’s entanglement is a true feature of the world or it is not a true feature of the world. [Law of Contradiction]

Premise 8: If Metaphysics and Epistemology’s entanglement is indeed a true feature of the world, then the theory of Idealism is true. [as per Axiom 3, and premises 4, 5, 6]

Premise 9: if Metaphysic’s and Epistemology’s entanglement is not a true feature of the world, then true knowledge of the world is impossible [as per Axiom 2].

Premise 10: the consequent in premise 9’s conditional (“we cannot achieve true knowledge of the world”) is self-contradictory, because this very statement would supposedly have to be true in order to be taken seriously, and if it is true then it would have to count as “true knowledge of the world,” which is the very thing which is supposedly stated to be impossible by the very the statement “we cannot achieve true knowledge of the world.” As you can see, the statement “we cannot achieve true knowledge of the world” is analogous to the statement: “this statement is false.” That is, it is a self-contradiction, a paradox. Avoiding this paradox is as easy as avoiding the assumption that leads us to this paradox, which in this case is the antecedent of premise 9’s conditional. [Reductio ad Absurdum]

Premise 11: The assumption (the antecedent of premise 9’s conditional) that lead us to this paradox was the assumption “Metaphysic’s and Epistemology’s entanglement is not a true feature of the world.” In order to avoid this assumption we just have to make the only other possible assumption: that Metaphysic’s and Epistemology’s entanglement is a true feature of the world. [Law of Contradiction and Disjunctive Elimination]

Conclusion: Therefore, Idealism is true [as per premises 8, 11].

Objection 1: Absurdism being Absurd/self-contradictory is not a Problem

For the sake of argument we may consider one objection: absurdism being absurd is not a problem for alternative 2, its a feature. Therefore we ought not to discard it from it being taken seriously as an alternative to position 1.

My response: absurdism is not psychologically feasible. Not person can genuinely sustain themselves in the contradiction that the world is unintelligible, because the very assertion that the world is unintelligible is itself evidence that the world is somewhat intelligible enough to be able to declare its unintelligibility.

Their response: is this contradiction (absurdity) not itself evidence of the truth of absurdism?

My response: the absurdist who subsequently declares that this contradiction is itself evidence of the unintelligibility/absurdity of the world is just doubling down on the fact that there is some intelligibility to the world, otherwise things like “evidence” wouldn’t be important.

Furthermore… a true absurdist is not even committed to absurdism; a true absurdist is so brute and spontaneous that he may even slip out of absurdism back into non-absurdism at any given point and resume the thread of logic that he may have previously abandoned. The chaos of absurdism allows for its own destruction, whereas the order of idealism never allows for its own destruction. Only one position is stable, the other one is unstable. As an intellectual matter, the stability or instability of absurdism doesn’t formally demonstrate the truth or falsehood of absurdism, but it does demonstrate the psychological impracticality of it. The default psychological preference of most humans is stability. Therefore, even saying nothing of its truth-value, Idealism, at the very minimum, seems to be the only psychologically practical alternative between itself and absurdism.