The Purpose of This Post
In the last post, I offered a self-contained argument for the metaphysical position of modal pantheism, by articulating a conception of divinity in which God is defined as “the totality of Being.”
In this post, I want to expand upon that argument in order to draw out the full implications of the metaphysical position of modal pantheism. Specifically, I intend to demonstrate how the position of modal pantheism can be proven from just two principles: 1. the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), and 2. the Principle of Plenitude (POP). Ultimately, my intention is to demonstrate that from these two principles alone I can prove the following three claims: 1. God is real (as long as we grant the definition of God as the “totality of Being”), 2. Free will is not real, 3. Morality is not real.
Grounding Principles
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
Definition
Every fact, positive or negative, has an explanation, or sufficient reason, for being. That is, everything that exists or does not exist has an explanation, or sufficient reason, for existing or not existing, respectively.
Grounding Axiom
Ex nihilo, nihil fit (from nothing, comes nothing/nothing comes from nothing and something can only come from something else). In short, the axiomatic groundwork for the PSR is an appeal to the innate human understanding of the law of causality. A contrarian may object to this appeal, but I do not believe any objection is psychologically feasible—i.e., I know of no man who sincerely believes (i.e., lives their lives with the assumption) that something can spontaneously come from nothing. Ex nihilo, nihil fit is not an abstract philosophical maxim, it is the concrete assumption that each and everyone one of us makes every day, it is the fabric of the regularity of the empirical world we inhabit.
Logical Proof
If we assume that the PSR is false, we are assuming that it is possible for some fact to exist without explanation/reason for existing. The term for a fact that has no explanation/reason for existing is a “brute fact.”
To suggest that a brute fact is possible, is to suggest that there is some possible world in which the brute fact is instantiated.
If the brute fact is instantiated in any possible world, there would be (by definition of it being brute) no reason/explanation as to why the brute fact would be different from any other fact in existence. In other words, because a brute fact is not explained or caused by anything, there is nothing that can explain or cause it to be different from any other thing.
Therefore, if one brute fact exists, there is no principle of individuation in virtue of which we can distinguish this brute fact from any other fact in existence.
Therefore, if one brute fact exists, all facts are brute.
But all facts are not brute, because at least one fact in existence has a sufficient explanation/reason.
Therefore, no facts are brute.
Therefore, the PSR is true.
The one fact which can be demonstrably shown to have a sufficient explanation is existence itself.
Demonstration:
- Why does existence exist?
- Existence exists because the only other alternative is non-existence.
- Non-existence, is by definition, non-existent and therefore not a real alternative.
- Therefore, the fact of existence is owed to the fact that existence alone exists.
- Existence finds a sufficient explanation for itself in itself.
Analysis
- Appealing to existence as an example of a sufficient fact is, in fact, just an extension of the axiom ex nihilo, nihil fit.
- A logical proof for the PSR depends on the inviolability of the starting axiom.
The principle of Plenitude
Definition
Every intrinsic logical possibility is actual. (An intrinsic logical possibility is any non-self-contradictory conception).
grounding Axiom
The principle of sufficient reason. If an intrinsically logical possibility existed only in the abstract, but was not instantiated, it would constitute a violation of the PSR. The reasoning for this is outlined by modus tollens, (i.e., if p –> q, -q, therefore -p). In other words, according to the PSR everything that does exist has a reason for existing; conversely everything that does not exist has a reason for not existing. If X does not exist, it, therefore, must have a reason for not existing. However, there is no reason for X not to exist. Therefore, via modus tollens, X must exist. In other words, if the actual world was sub–optimal, the non-existent but intrinsically possible objects would have no reason for not existing—which would be a brute fact and violation of the PSR.
The Metaphysical Implications of PSR + POP
The conjunction of the PSR and the POP, entails a version of the metaphysical position of modal monism. Modal monism, essentially, equivocates logicality with physicality, regarding logical possibility as coextensive with physical existentiality. Modal monism, furthermore, entails modal realism. Modal realism asserts that every logically possible world is actual, and therefore is as real as the actual world we live in. Ultimately, this collectively entails the metaphysical position of substance monism.
My demonstration for modal realism is ultimately grounded on one underlying principle—the PSR. That is to say, the version of modal realism I endorse is explicitly reducible to one underlying ontology—phenomenal reality defined in terms of intelligibility via rationalism (PSR). Therefore, insofar as the modal structure of all reality (every possible world) is reducible to one entity, the PSR (which itself is an embodiment of the concept of reason), it can be construed as identical to that one entity. Put simply, nothing is expressed in the concept of Reason that is not contained in the concept of all Reality. Therefore, all Reality can be conceived as constituting one Substance, the essence of which is Reason.
For the abovementioned reasons, I argue that the position of modal realism, as long as it is grounded on the PSR and the POP, entails the metaphysical position of substance monism. The plurality of worlds is reducible, and therefore, identical with, one ontology—reason (as expressed in the PSR).
Claim One: God is Real
If we synthesize the implications of everything that has been stated up to this point we arrive at quite the impressive portrait.
Here we have the portrait of an all-encompassing reality, comprised of every conceivable possible state of affairs, which is, nevertheless, fundamentally One. We have nothing short of an ontological system which simultaneously ascribes both incredible complexity as well as incredible simplicity to the ontological entity of a single, all-encompassing monistic Substance.
This all-encompassing Substance is coextensive with the definition of “that than which nothing greater can be conceived,” as well as the “totality of Being.” Concordantly, this all-encompassing Substance is simply another name for God.
Ultimately, the conjunction of the PSR and the POP entails well-justified groundwork for modal pantheism and/or substance monist pantheism.
Claim Two: Free Will is Not Real
The conclusion of modal realism is sufficient to demonstrate the falsehood of free will.
For one, modal realism suggests that every possible world exists in actuality. This suggests that all possible events (i.e., everything that ever was, is, and will be) is already in action somewhere in reality. This metaphysical position has another name: necessitarianism (i.e., the metaphysical belief that rejects all mere possibility). In other words, according to necessitarianism (every thing that is, is necessarily).
The unavoidable conclusion of modal realism/necessitarianism is an absence of free will. After all, everything you ever have done, are doing, or will do, is 1. nothing more than one of the possibilities that was already written into the fabric of Being and 2. absolutely necessary.
That is to say, all the events in this world, including your actions and thoughts, are, by definition, already be mapped out as a part of the eternal constellation of all logical possibilities. Nothing you ever do or ever will do can break from this eternal constellation. Everything that has ever been has been nothing more than the necessary unfolding of this eternal constellation.
The aggregate of all these possible worlds is immutable—all the possibilities that already exist could not have not existed and never will not exist. Everything is as it always was.
Your actions and thoughts, therefore, are not free, on account of the fact that your actions and thoughts are part of that immutable aggregate of possibilities—you could not have thought or acted otherwise from how you actually did, because the actual set of what was possible never changed. Nothing ever changes, everything just is as it always was.
Let me demonstrate the matter a bit more methodically. Free will is defined as “the ability to have done otherwise/differently from what was actually done.”
If by “the ability to have done otherwise/differently from what was actually done,” one refers to the theoretical ability to have acted differently in a given scenario (granting the miraculous ability for Time to be magically reversed back to the point prior to the action in question) then this is impossible. It is impossible, because according to modal realism/necessitarianism, the timeline of this world is simply one of the set of possibilities that is already written out in the constellation of every other prewritten possibility. There is no reason as to why the set of possibilities that defines this world would play out any different the second time around than the first.
If you find this line of argument unconvincing, don’t fret: I will demonstrate how there is no free will on the mere basis of the PSR.
According to the PSR, every fact must have an explanation. If every fact has an explanation, we may implore into the explanation for the totality of existence. Since nothing exists outside the totality of existence, by definition, the totality of existence must find its ultimate explanation within itself. The totality of existence is therefore explanatorily independent, i.e., it is a self-contained explanatory unit. This line of thought immediately entails two implications, both of which obliterate the notion of free-will.
Eternal Recurrence: a self-contained entity as existence, which is self-explained, will never have not had the explanation for its existence within itself. Therefore, existence will never have not existed—it is eternal. An eternal entity stretches infinitely into the past and future, without end. In an infinite timeframe, anything that is logically possible will happen infinitely many times. Therefore, for any given action, X, the action will have been repeated infinitely many times and will be repeated infinitely many more times. Insofar as a repetition of something denotes the exact replication of that thing (with no deviation or change), all given actions we perform in our lives are bound towards perfect replications of past repetitions and future repetitions. Any given action of ours, therefore, is not free, since we are bound to act in exactly the same way we have acted in the past (i.e., we lack the ability to do otherwise but what we have already done). Life is like an infinitely looping video—there is no freedom from the constraints of repeating cycles. (Basically, this is an affirmation of Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal recurrence—everything that ever happened and ever will happen will always happen again and again and again…).
Immutability: The totality of existence, is comprised of a set of causal events, each of which find their explanation for transpiring in the particular manner in which they transpire from every other pre-existing and concurrent causal events (which themselves find their explanation for transpiring in the particular manner in which they transpire from every other pre-existing and concurrent causal event, and so on ad infinitum). In other words, the Universe is made-up of a causal chain of events that recede infinitely into the past, each event in the chain owing its existence particular manner of existence to a prior and/or concurrent event in the chain. Every event is locked in place by every other event, each comprising the reason for why they transpire in the way that they transpire. The whole of reality, therefore is a mutually inter-dependent, mutually reinforcing whole.
Since the aggregate of existence is self-contained and has, by definition, no existence outside of itself, there are two metaphysical possibilities: either 1. reality stretches outward into infinity, or 2. reality bends in on itself. If 1 is true, then all events have no final, ultimate, source of explanation. At the end of the day, there is only an infinite series of events stretching into the infinite past and infinite spatial present, each of which have a sufficient explanation for why they are the way that they are, leaving absolutely no room for randomness or variability. If 2 is true, then eventually all matter must loop back into itself, and be the source of its own mechanical causation. In other words, if Space loops in on itself, then all events find reason for being the way that they from themselves as well as the whole. In this scenario, asking why an event happens the way it happens would be like asking a point in a circle why it is where it is instead of some place different–the point is where it is, because every other spot is already filled up by another point, each of which occupy their respective spots because every other spot is doing the same. If Space bends in on itself, all Matter is intractably where it must be, because it is pushed by every other Matter to be where it must be.
Stated differently, the aggregate of existence is analogous to a crystalline structure, wherein every carbon atom owes its location of arrangement to the location of arrangement of every other carbon atom. Each carbon atom is pushed in place by every other carbon atom. The exception in this analogy is that whereas the crystalline structure has a spatial limit, the aggregate of existence may be said to either 1. stretch out infinitely without end, or may be said to 2. bend in on itself. Regardless of whether the answer is 1 or 2, all events in existence would have to mutually necessitate one another (as explained above). Therefore, the entire aggregate of existence is just a self-reaffirming totality—an immutable self-completion. Every phenomena unfolds in the particular way it unfolds necessarily, because every phenomena is locked in place by every other phenomena, which is locked in place by ever other other phenomena, and so on ad infinitum or until the phenomena loop back around to be the source of their own necessitation. Ultimately, the implication is clear: in existence there is no chance, no variability, and nothing is random. Therefore, there is no free will, because nothing could have gone otherwise from how it actually went.
Claim Three: Morality is Not Real
Specifically, when I say that “morality is not real,” I mean to say that there is no theoretically consistent model for morality. In other words, I don’t deny that “moral theories” and/or “moral intuitions” and/or “moral feelings” and/or “moral judgements” exist in the world. When I say that “morality is not real,” I simply mean to express the idea that “objective morality” is not real. “Objective morality,” in my opinion, is no more real than “free will.”
Speaking of free will, demonstrating that morality is not real is actually pretty easy, as long as you assume that there is no free will. Given that I have offered, what I think are pretty good arguments to suggest that free will is not real, I think it follows immediately from the arguments above that there is indeed no such thing as a morality.
The reason for this is straightforward: if there is no free will, then there can be no theoretically consistent account of moral responsibility. Without a theoretically consistent account of moral responsibility, however, the very edifice of “objective morality,” collapses. Moral feelings/judgements may persevere, but they are fundamentally ineffective if they cannot be attached to a theory of moral responsibility.
Let me illustrate my point: imagine Amanda, A, commits the action of murder, M, against her unsuspecting friend Kim, K, while Kim was asleep. Assuming free will is not real, responsibility for M action cannot be exclusively attached to A. A, we might say, is partly responsible for M, but not anymore than any of the other, pre-existing factors which lead A to do M. That is to say, every event which lead to M, is no less responsible in bringing about M than is A. Ultimately, under a deterministic system such as that of the material Universe, there can be no theoretically self-consistent justification for asymmetrically attributing more responsibility to A than literally any other factor which preceded and even occurred concurrently to M. If you doubt this, check the crystalline analogy again. Every event is determined by every other event, such that if responsibility is attributed to one event then responsibility must be distributed across the entire system. An inter-dependent system such as the mechanistic Universe has no pools of arbitrarily isolated responsibility, it has one continuum of responsibility distributed across the entire system.
If, however, A cannot be attributed exclusive causal responsibility for M, then A cannot either be attributed exclusive moral responsibility for M. That is to say, if A is not uniquely responsible for the “wrong action” of M, then A cannot be uniquely held to have been in the wrong. If anything, the entire inter-dependent system has to be condemned as having been in the moral wrong all at once. But if everyone and everything is equally in the moral wrong, then the moral judgement loses its meaning. It turns out therefore, that either no one gets attributed moral responsibility, or everyone gets attributed equal moral responsibility (in which case the moral responsibility loses its meaning).
The moral of the story: put simply, regardless of whether moral properties like “good” and “evil” are intrinsically real (i.e., intrinsic to the fabric of existence) [btw, I don’t think that they are], if there is no theoretically consistent model by which to attribute exclusive moral responsibility to a given person for a given action, then these properties are ineffectual and cannot be instantiated into proper practice. That is, even if moral properties exist “out there in the world somewhere,” they appear to be useless.
If you’re not convinced, don’t worry. There will be many future posts in which I expand on the implications of the things I have said here. For now though, I will wrap up this post.
Conclusion
I hope to have presented a convincing argument for the position of modal pantheism, but more than that I hope I have demonstrated that this can be reasonably, and efficiently accomplished through the aid of merely two starting principles: the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Plenitude.
I also hope, I have outlined, and successfully argued for, the implications of modal pantheism–that is, that both free will and morality (two often cherished illusions) don’t really exist.
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