Atheism Leads to Moral Nihilism

Introduction

In this post I want to argue that atheism leads to moral nihilism (i.e., the rejection of all objective moral values).

Before presenting those arguments, however, I want to clarify one thing.

By “atheism,” I am specifically referring to the very particular type atheism often seen in the West, and parroted by the scientistic New Atheist movement. In short, this is the type of atheism which corresponds to the metaphysical worldview known as reductionistic materialism. (Hence, every time I refer to “atheism,” I am referring to this particular version of atheism).

This is the type of atheism which is perpetuated by public intellectuals like Richard Dawkins, the late Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett.

Broadly speaking this is the type of atheism which operates on worldview that human existence can be exclusively explained in terms of a fundamentally material, inanimate Universe which configure itself into its current form through certain laws (like the physical laws of gravity, electromagnetism, the strong nuclear force, and the weak nuclear force, and biological laws of natural selection).

For this post, my intention is not to challenge this worldview, but rather to assume that this worldview is true in order to investigate what, if any, logical conclusions follow from such a position.

Put simply, my intention with this post is to argue that one of the logical conclusions of this worldview is a form of moral nihilism, specifically the type of moral nihilism which is academically called “Meta-Ethical Error Theory.”

The Argument

Preliminary Definitions

“Objective” vs “Subjective”

Examples of Objective Claim:

• “2 + 2 = 4,”
• “all triangles have three sides,”
• “all bachelors are unmarried.”

All these claims rationally oblige me to admit their truth. Moreover, the truth of these claims is consistent across different times under the same set of circumstances.

In order for morality to be true, it must be objective, and in order to be objective it must be able to make claims that meet this threshold.

“Relative”

The term “relative,” is a sub-variant of “objective.” It refers to a claim that is only objective in relation to some pre-established framework.

Consider the following example: the claim “Harry Potter is a Wizard,” is a true claim, but only relative to the pre-established canon of J.K. Rowling’s fictional world, otherwise the claim is false because there is no such thing as a “Wizard” in the real world.

Ethical Frameworks and “Standards of Rightness”

As anyone who has ever taken an interest in philosophy knows, there are various candidate theories for objective ethics.

The three most popular candidate theories are deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics.

These three theories are mutually exclusive. That is, each one of them is an ethical framework in and of itself, seeking to provide a full and complete account of morality without external aid or reference to other frameworks.

Each of these frameworks operate on mutually incompatible starting principles named “standards of rightness.” A standard of rightness is exactly what it sounds like, it is a starting principle which defines what is good and what is bad, and from which the rest of an ethical framework can be developed.

Deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics all have distinct standards of rightness.

Deontology

Deontology is most popularly associated with Immanuel Kant.

According to this ethical framework, the standard of rightness is the “Categorical Imperative.” The following video is an adequate enough introduction.

Put simply, for Kant, goodness is good for its own sake.

Consequentialism (utilitarianism)

Consequentialism is most popularly expressed in the form of utilitarianism.

According to this ethical framework, the standard of rightness is the “principle of utility.” The following video can illustrate what this means precisely.

Put simply, in utilitarianism, goodness is what brings about the best utility, which is defined usually along the lines of “the optimal net value of pleasure over pain.”

Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is most popularly expressed in the form of Aristotelian ethics.

According to this ethical framework, the standard of rightness is the “golden mean.” The following viedo can illustrate what this means precisely.

Put simply, in Aristotelian ethics, goodness is the virtue which best approximates the mean between two vices. Specifically, the virtue is often a character-trait (like courage, wisdom, patience) which is the mean between a vice of excess (foolhardiness, pedantry, apathy) and a vice of dearth (cowardice, foolishness, impatience).

“Descriptive” vs “Normative”

Ethical claims come in two varieties: 1. descriptive and 2. normative.

Descriptive ethical claims describe what is wrong and what is right. In other words, descriptive ethical claims assign negative moral value to certain things (this is wrong) and positive moral value to other things (this is right). An example of a descriptive ethical claim would be: “X is wrong.”

Normative ethical claims go a little further. Normative ethical claims describe/assign what is right and wrong, and then on top of that, they announce what we ought to or what we should do in light of those supposed facts. Normative ethical claims, therefore, explicitly prescribe which course of action is obligatory. An example of a normative ethical claim would be: “Thou shalt not do X.”

Normative claims are implicitly descriptive and explicitly descriptive. After all, how can you say “thou shalt not do X,” unless you have a conception of “X is wrong”? In other words, normative ethics presupposes descriptive ethics.

“Rightness” and “Wrongness”

If true, descriptive ethical claims like “X is wrong,” seem to reflect a very interesting aspect of reality–the fact that things have the intrinsic properties of “rightness” or “wrongness.”

Let me explain what I mean:

1. A claim like “X is wrong,” is like any other claim, either one of two things: 1. true or 2. false.
2. If a claim like “X is wrong,” is false, then it can be easily dismissed for a variety of reasons.
3. If a claim like “X is wrong,” is true, then there is a very real sense in which this claim reflects an intrinsic aspect of existence. The claim, after all, is supposedly a true disclosure of a genuine fact about the nature of a particular aspect of the Universe. If “X is wrong,” is a true statement, then it is true of something, and that something is the Universe–the Universe must contain “wrongness” and “rightness,” as intrinsic aspects of its existence.

This intrinsic wrongness and rightness is the prerequisite for the objectivity of standards of rightness.

How else, after all, can an ethical framework argue that “X is wrong,” unless it presupposes the objective existence of intrinsic wrongness and rightness to the Universe?

The question, therefore, of whether descriptive ethical claims are true, depends on whether rightness and wrongness are true properties intrinsic to the Universe.

“Rightness” and “Wrongness”= Attitudinal Judgements

Are “Rightness” and “Wrongness” Intrinsic?

According to an atheistic (reductionist materialist) worldview, the answer has to be no.

There is nothing in a purely materialist worldview from which you could deduce the existence of rightness and wrongness.

Let me elaborate further:

1. There are two types of descriptive claims: 1. ethical descriptive claims and 2. non-ethical descriptive claims.
   • Ethical descriptive claim: “X is wrong”
   • Non-ethical descriptive claim: “X is weights 115 kg”
2. Ethical descriptive claims are true, in relation to a pre-established standard of rightness. However, what determines which pre-established standard of rightness a person chooses? Nothing more than a personal preference, bias, or attitude. The truth, of an ethical descriptive claim rests on personal discretion.
3. Non-ethical descriptive claims are true, but only in relation to a pre-established standard of mathematics. The standard of mathematics that a person chooses to make such claims is not based on personal preference, bias, or attitude. The standard of mathematics directly corresponds to a concrete observable experience: the weight of X itself.
4. Ethical descriptive claims ultimately rest on personal discretion over which standard to use. The result of this is that different people have different discretions, and therefore wildly different moral judgements. In contrast, non-ethical descriptive claims rest no personal discretion over which standard to use, other than your choice of the efficiency with which you want to quantify the immediate objective reality that exists within your experience.
5. Put simply, non-ethical descriptive claims seem to refer to something that is immediately corroborated in experience, whereas ethical descriptive claims seem to refer to something wholly private, and often inconsistent with other persons’ judgements.

The central difference between ethical descriptive claims and non-ethical descriptive claims seems to be that the former relies on attitude, whereas the latter does not.

No other objective property of observed reality seems to depend on attitude, which implies that rightness and wrongness are not intrinsic to reality.

“Normative Force”

If true, normative ethical claims like “Thou shalt not do X,” seem to possess a very unique power–the power to command a person to act a certain way, even if that commandment goes contrary personal wishes and preferences.

Let me explain my reasoning:

1. A claim like “Thou shalt not do X,” is like any other claim, either one of two things: 1. true or 2. false.
2. If a claim like “Thou shalt not do X,” is false, then it can be easily dismissed for a variety of reasons.
3. If a claim like “Thou shalt not do X,” is true, then there is a very real sense in which this claim possesses a unique power. The claim, after all, is compelling me to not do something. In other words, the claim is compelling me to act a certain way. So, if the claim is true, then that means that the compulsion is correct. If the commandment is true, then it is not just true in a trivial factual sense, but in a very concrete way which requires me to act in a certain way.

This compulsion, this requirement, this commanding-force, is very significant aspect of the supposed truth of normative claims.

In philosophy, this power is called “normative force.”

Normative force is the prerequisite for the objectivity of normative ethical claims. After all, if a claim like “Thou shalt not do X,” does not actually possess any normative force with which to compel me to act that way, then in what sense is the claim really true?

“Normative Force” = “Non-Causal ReQuirement”

“Normative force,” does not violate “free will.”

For instance, I do not have to follow a moral commandment the same way I have to follow the law of gravity. I can choose to to not follow/ignore a moral commandment; I cannot choose to not follow/ignore the law of gravity.

Therefore, “normative force” is a unique sort of compulsion/requirement. A moral commandment supposedly imposes a requirement upon me, telling me I have to act a certain way, but it never necessarily causes me to follow that requirement or act that certain way.

“Normative force,” therefore can be described as a form of “non-causal requirement.” That is, ethical claims like “Thou Shalt not do X,” require my conformity to a certain action, but cannot guarantee it.

This is what separates “normative force,” from every other force known to mankind, like the “electromagnetic force,” or the “gravitational force,” or the “strong and weak nuclear forces.” Every force in the Universe requires my conformity and guarantees it, with the exception of the “normative force.”

Descriptive and Normative Ethical Claims are Not Objective

My argument basically boils down to one claim broken into two parts:

1. Atheism (reductionist materialism) also offers no grounding and/or reason to believe that rightness and wrongness are intrinsic properties “out-there” in the Universe. Intrinsic rightness and wrongness are prerequisites for the objectivity of descriptive ethical claims. Therefore, atheism offers no grounding and/or reason to believe that descriptive ethical claims are objective.
2. Atheism (reductionistic materialism) offers no grounding and/or reason to believe that “normative force” is a real force “out-there” in the Universe. Normative force is the prerequisite for the objectivity of normative ethical claims. Therefore, atheism offers no grounding and/or reason to believe that normative ethical claims are objective.

Non-objectivity of Descriptive Ethical Claims:

1. There are various ethical frameworks, each with their own standard of rightness.
2. A descriptive ethical claim like “Murder is wrong,” is objectively true only relative to a pre-established standard of rightness.
   • For instance, relative to a utilitarian standard of rightness, murder might be morally permissible or even obligatory depending on the consequences that would follow from the murder. Relative to a deontological (Kantian) standard of rightness, murder is always wrong, regardless of consequences.
3. The objectivity of descriptive ethical claims, therefore, depends on which standard of rightness a person subscribes to.
4. The individuating factor between subscribing to one standard of rightness and another is a matter of personal discretion, an attitudinal judgement.
5. No other property within the natural-order of the material Universe depends on personal discretion to be true.
6. Atheism (reductionistic materialism) rejects the existence of anything outside the natural order of the material Universe
7. Therefore, atheism rejects the objective existence of rightness and wrongness.
8. This position is a form of moral nihilism, specifically meta-ethical error theory, because it claims that moral properties like rightness and wrongness are not grounded and/or we have no reason to postulate their existence.

Non-Objectivity of Normative Ethical Claims:

1. An atheistic worldview (reductionistic materialist worldview) does not believe that anything exists outside of the natural-order of the material Universe.
2. There is nothing in the natural-order of the material Universe which exhibits the curious property of “non-causal requirement.” In other words, every force which exists in the material Universe, exists only insofar as it both requires and guarantees conformity to it.
3. Therefore, there is no such thing, within the material Universe, as a force which does one of these things but not the other.
4. However, this is exactly what defines the property of “normative force.”
5. Therefore, normative force exists outside of the natural-order of the material Universe.
6. Therefore, according to the atheistic worldview (reductionist materialist worldview) which does not believe in anything outside of the natural-order of the Universe, normative force is false.
7. Normative force is the prerequisite for the objectivity of normative ethical claims.
8. Thus, from an atheistic worldview, there is no such thing as objective normative ethical claims.
9. This position is a form of moral nihilism, specifically meta-ethical error theory, because it claims that moral properties like normative force are not grounded and/or we have no reason to postulate their existence.

In-Depth Explanations

Non-objectivity of Descriptive Ethical Claims:

A Basic Description

Descriptive ethical claims like “X is wrong,” are trying to say something true about the world, namely that there indeed does exist such a thing as “wrongness” out there in the world which X just so happens to be.

These claims, however, are (at least from the standpoint of a reductionist materialist atheist) false; there is nothing in a purely materialistic worldview which can justify the postulation of the existence of “wrongness” as intrinsic to the world.

Put simply, descriptive ethical claims like “X is wrong and Y is right,” rely on a concept of wrongness and rightness which supposedly correspond to an actual wrongness and rightness intrinsic to the world. However, an atheistic (reductionist materialist) worldview has no reason to postulate the existence of such things, because there is nothing internal to the natural-order of the material Universe that exhibits the behaviour of wrongness or rightness. Hence, from an atheistic worldview the claims “X is wrong, and Y is right,” must be false, inasmuch as the properties of rightness and wrongness do not refer to anything real at all.

Therefore, atheism leads moral nihilism in the form of ethical error theory.

A Basic Analogy

An ethical error theorist is to a moral realist, what an atheist is to a theist.

If a theist describes God as “all-powerful,” the atheist considers this claim false by default, insofar as there is nothing out there in the world that corresponds to the concept of God, in virtue of which the claim “God is all-powerful” is true.

Morality is very much the same to the ethical error theorist. For instance, if a moral realist describes morality as “good,” the ethical error theist considers this claim false by default, insofar as there is nothing out there in the world that corresponds to the concept of morality, in virtue of which the claim “morality is good,” is true.

Inconsistency of Ethical Descriptors

The atheist has no reason to postulate the existence of objective “wrongness” or objective “rightness.”

Why is this the case? Because no other observable properties within the natural-order of the material Universe exhibit such a level of inconsistency. Put another way, no other property which atheists consider to be objective aspects of the Universe exhibits as much inconsistency as does the supposed properties of “rightness,” and “wrongness.” This implies, in turn, that rightness and wrongness are, in fact, not true objective properties of the material Universe.

The consistency of a claim like “2 + 2 = 4,” or of a claim like “all triangles have three sides,” or of a claim like “all bachelors are unmarried,” contrasts greatly with the inconsistency of descriptive ethical claims.

The source of this inconsistency, as I will show shortly, is due to the fact that the source of a descriptive ethical claim is the standard of rightness on which a person chooses to make that descriptive ethical claim. However, the decision over which standard of rightness to rely on is arbitrary, and based only on an attitudinal predisposition/bias. Therefore, descriptive ethical claims are inconsistent, precisely because their ultimate foundation is an arbitrary attitudinal whim which can fluctuate across time even within the same person. That is to say, a utilitarian may suddenly have a conversion experience and become a deontologist, or vice versa. These spontaneous changes in attitude completely change the moral calculus a person makes, and therefore radically changes the determination of the rightness and wrongness of a thing, even if that thing did not change at all over the duration of time in which the person had their sudden attitude change. Thus rightness and wrongness are inconsistent over time even under the same exact set of circumstances. Therefore, rightness and wrongness not objective.

Consider the following thought experiment:

1. Take for instance, the action of a hypothetical murder. Let us say all the relevant facts about the action are already known—no new information will ever be revealed.
2. Let us say that the person murdered was a serial puppy killer, and that the person who murdered them was a one-time vigilante who took justice into his own hands and poisoned the puppy killer in his sleep in a completely painless manner—no people mourned, or will ever mourn the loss of the puppy killer. There are no adverse effects whatsoever which would ensure from the murder of the puppy killer which would not have otherwise ensued if the puppy killer had not been murdered. In terms of consequences, the world is unequivocally a better place.
3. A consequentialist, let’s call him person X, will consider the murder morally right.
4. A deontologist, let’s call him person Y, will consider the murder wrong.
5. If all relevant facts about the action are already known, how could there possibly be a difference of opinion? No other objective science in which all the relevant facts are already known would ever have two contrasting conclusions. This implies that either a. all the relevant facts are not known (which is impossible by the very defining terms of this thought experiment) or b. ethics is not an objective science.
6. Moreover, consider the plausible scenario where the deontologist de-converts from deontology and becomes a consequentialist. Once the deontologist becomes a consequentialist, he will have to agree to that murder was indeed morally right. Let’s call the deontologist before he became a consequentialist person Y^1, and let’s call the deontologist after he become a consequentialist Y^2.
7. The only difference between person Y^1 and person Y^2 is the passing of some time.
8. No new facts have been discovered in the case, and yet person Y^1 has completely contrasting opinion to person Y^1. Therefore, the only difference between the perception of the property of the wrongness of the murder of the puppy killer (person Y^1’s perception), and the perception of the property of the rightness of the murder of the puppy killer (person Y^2’s perception) is the mere passing of some time.
9. Therefore the perception of the properties of rightness or wrongness are inconsistent across time even within the exact same set of circumstances.
10. Therefore, the perception of the properties of rightness and wrongness is a subjective perception, not an objective perception, as per the definitions of subjective and objective.

Non-Objectivity of Normative Ethical Claims

A Basic Description

Normative ethical claims like “Thou shalt do X,” are trying to say something true about the world, namely that there indeed does exist such things as “moral obligations” out there in the world which X just so happens to be. Conversely, there are normative ethical claims like “Thou shalt not do Z,” which are also trying to say something true about the world, namely that there indeed does exist such things as “moral prohibitions,” out there in the world which Z just so happens to be.

Moral obligations and/or prohibitions, however, presuppose the existence of the thing which we call “normative force,” i.e., the mysterious power of ethical claims to require but not guarantee our conformity to an authoritative commandment of some sort. In other words, “normative force” is supposedly a real force out there in the world which, unlike every other force in the material Universe, exhibits “non-causal requirement.”

These claims, however, are (at least from the standpoint of a reductionist materialist atheist) false; there is nothing in a purely materialistic worldview which can justify the postulation of the existence of “normative force” as intrinsic to the world.

Put simply, normative ethical claims like “X is obligatory and thus you should do it,” rely on a concept of “normative force” which supposedly corresponds to an actual “normative force” intrinsic to the world. However, an atheistic (reductionist materialist) worldview has no reason to postulate the existence of such a thing, because there is nothing internal to the natural-order of the material Universe that exhibits the behaviour of requiring something but not guaranteeing it. Hence, from an atheistic worldview the claims “X is obligatory and thus you should do it,” must be false, inasmuch as the property of normative force does not refer to anything real at all.

Therefore, atheism leads to moral nihilism in the form of ethical error theory.

The Non-Existence “Normative Force”

In what sense is a “force” a “force,” if it doesn’t make itself manifest in the causal order of the material Universe.

Gravity is called a force because it causally forces me to be attracted to bodies with large masses.

Electromagnetism is a called a force because it causally forces the opposite ends of magnets to be attracted to one another.

The strong nuclear force is called a force because it causally forces quarks to be held together in order to help them constitute the atomic nucleus.

Put simply, the natural forces which are observed as objective properties of the Universe exhibit the property of causal efficacy. In other words, they are successful at coercing events to conform to them.

Does “normative force,” do this? No. Normative force is the only supposed force which is causally ineffective.

In what sense, then, is normative force even a force? Moreover, if normative force isn’t even a force, then what is it?

A moral commandment, then, doesn’t seem to be referring to anything real in the world when it presupposes the existence of normative force.

If this is true, then there is no real reason to follow a moral commandment whatsoever.

An atheistic (reductionist materialist) worldview, therefore, invariably leads moral nihilism by way of meta-ethical error theory.

Conclusion

In this post we argued why atheism, by which I have meant the reductionist materialist worldview that most contemporary Western atheists proport to subscribe to, leads to moral nihilism, specifically in the form of meta-ethical error theory.

In the next post I want to expand on this topic, by arguing that any atheist who believes in objective morality is living according to a contradiction.

In short, my argument will be this: belief in objective morality requires no less a leap of faith than does the belief in a personal, anthropomorphic God; therefore, most western atheists should either a. embrace leaps of faith as valid to forming beliefs (thereby accepting the validity of taking a leap of faith in the existence of Morality and God), or b. reject leaps of faith as valid to forming beliefs (thereby rejecting the validity of belief in Morality and God).