The Brain is a Process of Mind

Introduction

Why the Brain Is Not The Same As The Mind

This post is continuation of the post titled “Why the Brain is not the Same as the Mind.”

Ironically, in this post I want to propose something which seems (but doesn’t actually) undermine/contradict everything I have said in the last post (this is a problem I will address shortly).

I want to propose, that, contrary to popular opinion, the brain is a process of the mind, rather than the other way around. That is, what we call the brain is nothing more than a mere extension of consciousness.

Clarification

Stating that the brain is a process of the mind, is slightly different from outright saying that the brain is caused by the mind. This is because, stating that the brain is a process (rather than a mere effect) of mind entails an identity relationship between the brain and the mind, and doesn’t carry with it the connotational baggage of a cause-effect ontological distinction. In summary, according to my position, the brain (as a process of mind) is not separate from mind, but rather is identical to mind.

In short, I am claiming that brain = mind.

Problem #1

But doesn’t this contradict the previous post, whose entire point was to show that the brain ≠ mind? How can I say that brain ≠ mind in the previous post, but now say that brain = mind in this post?

Solution to Problem #1

The solution to problem #1 is straightforward: the equation brain = mind is conditional.

The condition is thus: assume that mind is ontologically prior to the brain.

Put simply: the equation brain = mind is correct if and only if the condition listed above is met. Therefore, brain = mind if we assume that mind is ontologically prior to the brain; if, however, we assume the converse (that the brain is ontologically prior to the mind) then the claim brain = mind is false.

Therefore, in the previous post, when we argued that brain ≠ mind, we were arguing from the assumption that the brain was ontologically prior to the mind.

Explanation of Solution to Problem #1

The two opposing assumptions, are representative of two opposite metaphysical positions.

1. The assumption that the mind is ontologically prior to the brain represents the position of idealism (the metaphysical position which states that the world is fundamentally mental).
2. The assumption that the brain is ontologically prior to the brain represents to the position of realism (the metaphysical position which states that the world exists independent of mind) and also represents the position of physicalism (that the world which exists independent of mind is of a physical nature, in-and-of-itself).

Assumption 2 is the mainstream position(s), and it is the position(s) which I argued against in my last post. This was the position which argued that “Brain causes the Mind and/or the Mind is a process of the Brain.”

In the last post, I argued that this position fails in the face of The Hard Problem of Consciousness, and leaves us with an explanatory gap between Mind/Consciousness and Body/Matter. As a result of this failure, in the last post, I argued that this left us with two other alternative explanations:

1. That the Brain and Mind are synchronized perfectly but neither cause the other (corresponds with certain versions of substance dualism or property dualism).
2. That Brain is caused by the Mind and/or the Brain is a process of the Mind (corresponds with the position of idealism).

As you will notice, in this post, I am endorsing only the latter articulation of the position of Idealism. That is, rather than say the brain is caused by the Mind, I want to argue the brain is a process of mind.

This position, is similar to the position that the brain causes the mind but for important reasons, is significantly different (1. it dispels the cause-effect ontological distinction, 2. for reasons I will discuss in later posts, “causality,” is not a term which properly applies to non-physical things [causality is internal to the category of matter]).

For now though, the only thing you have to worry about as the reader is this: the position that the brain is a process of the mind, is functionally identical to the position that the brain is caused by the mind. Hence, for all intents and purposes, both articulations can be collapsed into one simple position/assumption: the mind is ontologically prior the brain. In other words, both of these positions are essentially different expressions of one underlying metaphysical commitment–the metaphysical commitment to idealism.

According to both of these positions, which are both expressions of idealism, brain = mind if and only if we assume the condition that the mind is ontologically prior to the brain.

Explanation of Solution to Problem #1 Continued

So with all of that said, let me finally explain my rationale for why I am justified in making the assumption that the mind is ontologically prior to the brain.

My rationale is simple: everything and anything one has ever, could ever, and will ever perceive, know, experience, acknowledge, understand, disagree or agree with, etc., has to be done through the filters of consciousness. Nothing exists separate from the consciousness which perceives it to exist. This includes, most radically, the brain itself.

This is why the claim brain = mind is true, but only as long as we assume that mind is ontologically prior to the brain. If, after all, we define the brain as an object of knowledge (i.e., a thing which can be observed and learned about and understood), we have necessarily defined the brain as a thing which is accessible through consciousness. That is to say, the brain exists as it exists only insofar as it is perceived to exist as such by our consciousness (i.e., consciousness is ontologically prior to the brain; the brain is the object, our consciousness is the subject). Concordantly, the things we observe about the brain (like neurons, synaptic connections, neurotransmitters, etc.) would all just be part of our conscious observations (i.e., the brain and all of its constituent structures of complexity and behaviours exist as they do only insofar as they are perceived to exist as such by consciousness). Therefore, what we call “brain states,” are just extensions of conscious experience. Therefore, Brain = mind, if we assume that mind is ontologically prior to brain.

Inversely, this is why the claim brain ≠ mind is true. That is, if you deny that consciousness is the precondition for the existence of the brain, and instead insist that the brain can and does exist independent of the mind, in some absolute sense unconditioned by consciousness “out-there in the world,” it’s no wonder that the brain ≠ mind, because by the very definition of these parameters, the brain (and by extension the rest of the physical universe) has been defined as something which is utterly separate from the mind.

Objection #1

At this point the realist physicalist might argue the following: “I don’t necessarily deny that consciousness is the precondition for the appearance of the brain as it appears to exist, but I deny that the claim that all there is to the brain is the appearance it has for the mind. In other words, just because the brain can only be perceived through consciousness doesn’t mean it doesn’t have an existence outside of consciousness. Therefore, physicalism is still true.”

Response #1 to Objection #1

My response is simple: physicalism doesn’t have the explanatory power to account for the world as it appears.

Let the following argument demonstrate the logical end-point of physicalism:

1. P1: Space and Time are relative, according to general relativity. [definition]
2. P2: Relativity exists only because of individual (conscious) points of view. [assumption]
3. P3: A world independent of consciousness, would have to be a world which is also independent of relativity. [P1, P2]
4. P4: A world independent of consciousness, therefore, do not have relative Time or relative Space, but instead non-relative (Absolute) Time and non-relative (Absolute) Space.
5. P5: Non-relative (Absolute) things are undifferentiated (i.e., they have no internal distinctions between themselves and are irreducible). [assumption]
6. P5: Absolute Time-Space, therefore, do not have any internal distinctions (i.e., all Times would be identical to themselves, and all Spaces would be identical to themselves).
   • past-present-future distinctions exist only insofar as there exists conscious individuals for which these relative terms apply. Likewise, the distinctions of here or there, apply only for conscious individuals for which relativity is the only means of intelligibility. Without consciousness, relative distinctions in Space and Time are obliterated.
7. P6: In the conscious-independent world, Space-Time exists as one identical composite, physicalist Monad.

Where does this lead us?

“The Monad,” a world where Space-Time exists as composite unit without internal distinctions, is the logical end-point of all physicalism which aims to describe the world as it truly exists, independent of consciousness.

But this leads us to an all-important question:

How exactly, does the Monadic world, of Absolute Time and Space, become the non-Monadic world, of relative Time and Space?

Physicalism’s inability to answer this question:

If the physicalist Monad is ontologically prior to consciousness, then the Monad has to be able to account for the current existence of the world, in and of itself. If, after all, the Monad truly is the metaphysical firmament, the true world as it exists in-itself, as the physicalist claims that it is, then the Monad must have the explanatory power to explain the world all by itself, without reference to anything else.

But the Monad doesn’t have the explanatory power to do this. Why? Because there is nothing intrinsic to the postulated nature of Absolute Space-Time which can account for the radical transformation from Monad to non-Monad. That is, there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of Monad that suggests that it could ever become something like the non-Monadic world we occupy in our everyday lives.

For instance, if in the Monad, all Time-Space is identical, how could there ever even be a process of becoming anything other than itself, since the very idea of “process“ and “becoming“ requires relative Space and Time.

The only possible answer is consciousness:

The only way the Monad can account for the emergence of relativity is through a reference to consciousness. That is, the Monad cannot explain how Absolute Space-Time collapsed into relativity, unless it does so through a reference to consciousness. Therefore, the Monad has to presuppose the very thing it claimed to be independent of, and ontologically prior to, in order to muster an explanation for the world.

Unlike the Monad, consciousness can account for the existence of both relative and Absolute Space-Time, by itself without reference to anything else. That is, if we assume that consciousness is ontologically prior to Monad, rather than the other way around, then all of our confusion and trouble fades away.

1. Accounting for Absolute Space-Time: Monad is nothing more than an abstraction of consciousness, and therefore is possible through consciousness, rather than the other way around.
2. Accounting for Relative Space-Time: relative space and time are nothing more than the appearance consciousness interprets reality through. That is, Time and Space are real, as long as we define realness as a function of conscious perception, and not as something which exists independent of mind (i.e., all that there is to reality is perception). Mind/consciousness is the precondition for realness. Time and Space are real, but their realness is entirely internal to the logical category of consciousness. That is, Time and Space are real only insofar as they are perceived to be real. There is no basis for their reality other than in reference to consciousness. Most people have a knee-jerk reaction against this line of thought: they argue that there does exist a world independent of consciousness, independent of perception, but more often than not what they mean by this is a world which supposedly exists “outside” of our heads, and which has always existed “before” our consciousnesses evolved into existence. But the very ideas of “outside our heads,” and “before us,” are Spatial-Temporal concepts which are themselves constructs of the mind. In other words, the very idea of a world “outside our heads” and “before us” is predicated on points of reference which are only intelligible in reference to the consciousnesses which perceives them (i.e., there can be no outside or before, unless there is a conscious someone for which it is an outside or a before).

Response #2 To Objection #1

Another response: again, even if we assumed that the brain (and the rest of the physical universe) exists absolutely, in some unconditioned sense, independent of mind “out there in the world,” the burden of proof would still be on the physicalists’ shoulders’ rather than on the idealists’.

Why? Because all anyone ever truly knows is consciousness. Consciousness is the only thing which is self-evident, and unquestionable–it is literally the thing which makes all knowledge you have ever had or ever will have possible. The existence of something beyond consciousness is pure speculation.

Conclusion: But as we have shown above, and in the prior post, physicalism and realism are fraught with complications. Physicalism’s logical end-point cannot account for how the world of relativity emerges, and neither can it account for how consciousness emerges from nonconscious matter, as per the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

Objection #2

There is another set of closely-related objections which are readily waged against the idealism:

• If the world is only real insofar as you perceive it (i.e., if reality is just an appearance), does that mean that any and all perceptions are real? What about hallucinations and delusions–are they real?
• If the world is only real insofar as you perceive it (i.e., if reality is just an appearance), does that mean that at any given moment that you are not perceiving something that thing ceases to exist?
• If the world is only real insofar as you perceive it (i.e., if reality is just an appearance), does that mean that you can will yourself to violate the laws of nature, and make anything you imagine happen?
• If the world is only real insofar as you perceive it (i.e., if reality is just an appearance), does that mean that only you (the given conscious observer reading this) exists, and everyone else is an unconscious automaton that only appears to have consciousness?

Response #1 to Objection #2

Here’s a quick round of responses and their succinct explanations:

• Yes. Reality is just perception, so all perceptions are real, even what we designate as “delusions,” and “hallucinations.” The difference between “reality” as commonly agreed upon and “delusions,” is merely a matter of consensus. If everyone suffered from the same delusion we would just call it reality. Therefore, what is or is not a delusion is dependent on the number of people who perceive that thing.
• No. My lack of perceiving a thing, doesn’t make that thing not exist. The thing does not exist to me, but just because it does not exist to me, does not mean it automatically does not exist for someone else. Of course, this depends on assuming other people do exist, and genuinely have internal consciousnesses of their own (which I believe they do, for reasons that I will discuss shortly, and in later in my blog in another post). However, for the sake of argument, let’s assume other people do not exist. Even assuming this, my lack of perceiving a thing, doesn’t make that thing not exist. Why? Because all reality (perception) is interconnected with itself. Therefore, the perception of a configuration of Matter that I call a tree is interconnected the rest of the perceived and unperceived matter of the universe. Therefore, one perception is sufficient to ground all reality. The tree in my backyard, given the principle that all matter is interconnected, is evidence enough of the trees on the other side of the world. Now, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that not all matter was interconnected, or assume that I was deprived of all my sensory/perceptual faculties. Disregarding the logistics of this, and the metaphysical implications that this sensory deprivation would have on my consciousness, there is still one last path that I would have to salvage the notion that reality = perception. All conscious perception conforms to the PSR. The PSR, through the POP, necessitates the existence of all possible worlds (i.e., all possible timelines, and the corresponding arrangements of matter that facilitate said timelines). Therefore, the very fabric of perception presupposes a regularity to the Universe such that my personal lack of perceiving a thing, doesn’t make that thing not exist.
• No. Again, all conscious perception occurs in conformity to the PSR (i.e., conscious perception and the PSR are isomorphic). The laws of physics and nature, the regularity of the world, is a function of this. I cannot will a violation of the laws of physics anymore than I can will a violation of the logical law of identity (A = A). Regularity and order is isomorphic to conscious perception. Idealism doesn’t threaten the laws of nature, it enshrines them, and explains their inviolability.
• No. The PSR entails the POP, which itself postulates all possible kinds of existences. If I exist as a conscious mind, then I am a kind of existence (specifically the kind of existence that is a conscious mind). Therefore, all possible kinds of conscious minds exist too, in conjunction to my own.

Many of these answers will appear unnecessarily abstract and incomprehensible, but I promise the reader that over the course of my blog, these answers will become increasingly comprehensible, as I continue to explain the position of Idealism.

Why Idealism?

The combined efforts of the arguments from the last post, and the arguments from this post (up to this point), may very well have shaken your confidence in the correctness of physicalism and realism, but that still leaves out the second alternative we listed in the last post.

Rather than assuming that brain causes mind, or that the brain is a process of mind, why not assume that the brain and mind are synchronous but do not cause one another (i.e., parallelism)?

In other words, why is Idealism automatically better than the alternative of (neutral monist) property dualism?

(Neutral Monism) Property Dualism

The most famous advocate for neutral substance monism is the 17th century rationalist philosopher, Baruch Spinoza.

According to Spinoza reality is made up of a Monistic Substance.

According to Spinoza, the duality of the Physical and the Mental is but a means by which this one Substance disclosed itself to our intellectual faculties. Therefore, the duality between mind and body is but a conceptual one; Mind and Body both express the same underlying Substance; Mind and Body are, according to Spinoza, two different ways of conceptualizing of the same ontology.

This version of property dualism has many advantages:

1. It avoids the hard problem of consciousness, by grounding Mind in a neutral substance, rather than in Matter.
2. It avoids the interaction problem of Substance Dualism, by positing that the Physical and the Mental are not causally separate substances, but properties/aspects of one Substance. Therefore, there is no need to account for how Mind and Matter causally interact with one another, since they do not. They are simply coordinated and synchronous, so as to appear like they interact. Like two sides of the same coin, Mind and Matter do not cause each other, and yet they are inseparably parallel.

This version is probably the strongest alternative to idealism. Nevertheless, there are problems with this account that makes idealism preferable.

Problems with (Neutral Monism) Property Dualism

The Primacy of the Mental Property

It seems to me like neutral monism is self-defeating, because the very ontological system itself can only be conceived through the mental property.

For starters, the physical property of the neutral substance (the material world) is obviously only conceptualizable and observable through consciousness.

Secondly, and most importantly, the supposedly neutral substance can only be conceptualized as neutral precisely through the necessarily mental filter of the intellect.

Ultimately, the mental property has epistemic, and therefore, ontological primacy over and above both the neutral substance and the physical substance.

That is, the one thing which alone is self-evident, self-given, and absolutely certain is the existence of one’s own consciousness–the state of being aware, of having an experiential inner life.

Ontology concerns itself over what is, and what is not. Epistemology concerns itself over what can be known and what can’t be known.

Ontology and epistemology are one and the same in my opinion. What is or is not, cannot be determined to be or not to be, unless it is something which can be known to be or known not to be. Anything that is or is not, is only so through knowledge. Ontology and epistemology are isomorphic.

Therefore, that which is epistemically primary is ontologically primary–and that alone is Consciousness.

The physical world is what is perceived through consciousness, and therefore is secondary.

The idea of a neutral substance, in turn, is nothing more than an abstraction, a postulate conjured up through consciousness, in a self-defeating and ironic effort to displace consciousness from its primary status. Only consciousness could come up with something to replace itself from its primacy.

The Emergence Problem

The problem can be summarized by the following excerpt:

…some critics hold that neutral monism shares a common failing with materialism: namely, that it cannot accommodate experience. The argument is driven by two deep metaphysical convictions. First, experience cannot be reduced to or constructed from the non-experiential; second, radical emergence is unintelligible. Assuming that the neutral must be non-experiential, it follows that the neutral monist world has no room for experience.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/#ObjeNeutMoni

In short, in order for the neutral substance to be truly neutral it must independent, in some sense, from the physical and mental properties which it facilitates the emergence of. However, if this is the case, and the neutral substance is, by definition, non-mental, then how exactly does the non-mental neutral substance give way to the mental property? This would constitute a form of radical emergence, which is akin to a brute (unexplained) fact (i.e., a thing coming out of nothing). Assuming brute facts are impossible (as I, and everyone implicitly does) then this constitutes a great problem for neutral monism.

Conclusion

This post and the last were meant to serve as a very rudimentary, if perhaps inadequate and rushed, crash course on the major concepts in philosophy of mind. More than that, they were meant to serve as an introductory argument for idealism, by targeting the major alternative metaphysical candidate explanations of mind.

In the next post, I will launching a series that intends to comprehensively discuss my particular version of Idealism. In that series I will be laying down a groundwork which I hope will help to clarify the subtleties and complexities of my worldview.

That series will connect to the “Proof of God’s Existence Parts I-II,” and serve as the intellectual foundation for all my subsequent posts on metaphysics, ethics and politics.