The Groundwork For Idealism Part VI

Introduction

Over the course of the next few posts, my blog will be covering a range issues, including, but not limited to:

1. the advantages associated with using the PSR as a theoretical foundation for idealism,
2. the question of what precisely it means to say that “Matter is the visibility for Mind,” (and the implications associated with this view)
3. the exact nature of “Pure Mind,” within the context of this system (beyond merely its definition as a function of the negation of subjective self-objectification)
4. the question of what precisely it means to say that “Mind is reality experienced in (unindividuated) Time alone,”

In this post, I will be covering topic 1.

Advantages

Now, I want to be straightforward and succinct about the advantages of using the PSR (and the POP) as a foundation for idealism. I will list these now:

• Parsimony
• Solves the “Problem of Other Minds” (avoids solipsism)
• Compatible with science

Parsimony

By “parsimony,” I’m referring to the manner of explaining a phenomenon with the fewest possible number of assumptions. Alternatively, by “parsimony,” I can use the phrase “explanatory simplicity,” by which I refer to the practice of accounting and/or providing a self-consistent theoretical model of explanation for a thing from the fewest possible number of assumptions.

In philosophy, we are often looking for the most parsimonious explanations, not only because it is theoretically elegant, but because it requires the least number of assumptions, and is therefore the least likely explanation to have its claims rest on an erroneous assumption. That is, the less assumptions a position rests on, the less chance there is for there to have been an incorrect assumption made in the process of explaining a thing. Therefore, parsimony is ultimately an indicator to the correctness of an explanation.

My particular metaphysical system operates on the basis of a singular assumption: the assumption that the PSR is true. Everything else about my system, as shown in the last post, follows from this one assumption of the truth of the PSR.

The PSR, therefore, serves as an immediate groundwork in virtue of which the truth-value of all my metaphysical claims can be verified. In other words, I have a concrete principle I can appeal to at any given moment in order to justify my belief system. Everything else follows logically from this principle, and any objection against my metaphysical beliefs first has to be directed at the principle itself (again, because everything within my metaphysical system follows logically from said principle).

Of course, a reader might object: “but isn’t your assumption that X thing follows the PSR and additional assumption to the initial assumption you made about the truth of the PSR?”

My answer is simple: yes. The assumption that “X follows from PSR,” is additional to the assumption that “PSR is true.” You may correctly designate the former as assumption #2, while the latter assumption #1. Nevertheless, just because assumption #2 is additional to assumption #1, does not mean that assumption #2 is separate from assumption #1. What I mean by this is that assumption #2’s truth-value is verifiable on the basis of assumption #1. In other words, in order to determine whether assumption #2 is correct, all you need to do is clarify precisely what a person means when they make assumption #1 (i.e., whether or not “X follows from the PSR,” is true depends on exactly what I mean when I say “the PSR is true.” Obviously, when I say “the PSR is true,” I mean that “the PSR (whatever it’s true nature is) is true.” But that’s precisely the issue? What exactly is the true nature of the PSR? Depending on how we answer that question, we can determine whether or not assumption #2 is correct. Therefore, ultimately, assumption #2 ultimately defers back to assumption #1, such that there really is just one assumption central to my system. Every other additional assumption is but the aftermath of this one central assumption).

Anticipating and Pre-emptively Solving the “Problem of Other Minds”

The “problem of other minds,” can be defined as follows: it is the philosophical question of whether we can ever be epistemologically justified (i.e., have good reasons) in believing that that other minds, besides our own, truly exist. In other words, “the problem of other minds,” can be framed as the epistemological problem whether or not we can ever be justified in believing that “my mind is not the only mind in existence.”

Leaving the question unanswered, or answered in the negative ultimately seems to open the door to the possibility of solipsism (i.e., the position that only one’s mind exists, and everyone else only appears to have a mind). This position is highly counterintuitive, and therefore most people are willing to dismiss it quickly. That said, the position seems non-falsifiable (i.e., we can’t know with absolute certainty that solipsism isn’t true. The more you entertain the notion of solipsism, the less disprovable it seems, and the more plausible it appears. Sooner or later, if you don’t have a good argument against solipsism, you might start thinking: “maybe my mind really is the only mind in existence, and everyone else just looks like they have a mind.”

This is precisely the problem that basing my entire metaphysical system on the PSR solves.

Argument from ANAlogy (PSR)

I can be certain that my mind exists. Through the power of empirical observation, I can observe that my mental activity correlates with brain activity (i.e., the brain is the physical correlative of the un-physical stuff we call Mind). I can also observe that other people have brains, and similar brain activity to my own. It seems to me, like there is no good reason/sufficient explanation as to why the brains of other, which behave similarly to my own, would not also correlate with its own respective internal mental realm. In other words, the fact that I have my own brain, and that that brain’s activity correlates with an internal, private mind of my own, seems to suggest, by power of analogy, that other people’s brains (which behave similarly to my own) would also correspond to an internal, private mind of their own.

Fundamentally, there is no sufficient reason to postulate why my brain correlates with an internal, private, personal Mind while other people’s brains would not. To postulate such a thing would seem to violate the PSR (the very foundation of all my metaphysics). Hence, the very idea that other people do not have other minds is ludicrous.

Argument from Maximal Diversity (POP)

By basing my entire metaphysics on the PSR, I inherently incorporate the POP as part of my metaphysics (because the PSR entails the POP). By doing so, I affirm the maximal diversity of all kinds of existences. The kinds of existences, in turn, are themselves presupposed by the PSR. The PSR, as explained in the previous post, presupposes three kinds of existences: “Mind,” “Matter,” and “Monad.” Due to the POP, there must be a maximal diversity of all three of these kinds of existence. The inevitable result of this is obvious: the POP postulates a maximal diversity of “Mind,” (i.e., the POP postulates that all intrinsically possible Minds exist in actuality).

At first glance this seems to immediately solve the “problem of other minds.” After all, if “all intrinsically possible Minds exist in actuality,” then we can rest assured that my mind is not the only one in existence. However, things are not as simple as that.

This is because despite the fact that the POP basically allows us to know that the claim “all intrinsically possible minds exist in actuality” is true, it does not specify precisely what is or is not a “possible mind.” For all we know, my mind truly is the only possible mind. For that reason, technically speaking, the POP is not a sure-fire way of proving the existence of other mind’s with absolute certainty. Nevertheless, it is not without it’s use.

The threshold for solving the “problem of other minds,” was never absolute certainty. The threshold for solving the “problem of other minds,” was “good enough” certainty, (i.e., the certainty that is comprised of having good reasons to believe in something).

The only thing we can be absolutely certain of is the fact that our individual minds exist (I think, therefore I am). Beyond that, everything else is theory.

Theory is not absolute certainty, but it doesn’t have to be; theory just has to be self-consistent, be able to account for all the relevant facts, and be predicated on assumptions which we have good reason to believe. If a theory is able to do this, then that theory may not be able to give us absolute certainty, but it can give us “good enough certainty.”

In that vein, the POP succeeds in its job. Why? Because even though I cannot know with absolute certainty that my mind is not the only possible mind, it seems more unlikely to assume that it is, than to assume that it isn’t. For one, there’s seems nothing self-contradictory about conceiving of a mind, different from my own, which exists. For that reason alone, it seems unlikely to suggest that my mind is the only possible mind that could ever have or ever will exist.

Compatability with Science

Idealism is not Magic

Now for some reason or another, when I tell people that I’m an “Idealist,” (in the philosophical sense of the word), they tend to think that I somehow reject science. That is, when I tell people that I am an “Idealist,” (i.e., when I tell people that I believe that 1. Space and Time exist only in the Mind, and 2. that Mind, not Matter, is the fundamental substance of reality) people, for some reason, tend to believe that that means that I don’t believe in science.

For some reason, there seems to be an erroneous assumption that Idealism and Science are incompatible. People often confuse the belief that reality is created by the Mind with the belief that reality can be manipulated at will with our individual Minds. Put simply, people conflate idealism with magic.

In reality, this conflation of magic and idealism is simply not true–and no where in my philosophy is this clearer than in the PSR.

The PSR, as explained in the previous post, represents the underlying condition of cognition by which reality is rendered intelligible. The PSR represents the terms of intelligibility by which the metaphysical claims of Idealism are explicated.

What this ultimately means is rather simple: the world cannot make itself knowable to the human mind, unless it adheres to and conforms to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In other words, the world is cognizable only insofar as it manifests according to rational, universal, self-consistent laws.

The world only appears to us as a rational, logical phenomenon, because Mind can only conceptualize of reality as such. The world and its laws, therefore, cannot be bent to our wills at a mere whim, because that would be contrary to the PSR. Science is not contradicted nor undermined by Idealism; on the contrary, idealism is the metaphysical foundation for science.

Boiling this all down we arrive at a simple conclusion: the world of empirical, scientific knowledge is entirely compatible with the position of idealism. The world of empirical, scientific knowledge may very well exist only in Mind, rather than exist independently thereof, but that does not change the fact that it stills exists as such (i.e., it still exists as a world of self-consistent, regular, universal, inviolable laws).

Conclusion

This post covered quite a bit.

First I discussed the parsimony of my explanatory scheme, then I explained the “problem of other minds,” and my philosophical system’s ability to easily resolve that issue, and finally I explained how my version of Idealism is entirely compatible with the scientific world we are so accustomed to.

In the next post, I will be covering topic 2.