Why the Brain Is Not The Same As The Mind

Introduction

The purpose of this post is simple: I intend to challenge the mainstream philosophical position of metaphysical physicalism (and/or materialism).

This is a philosophical position which states that everything is physical and/or ultimately explainable in terms of physical properties. This is the de facto mainstream position of our science-intoxicated culture. According to this dominant view, reality is just a composition of fundamental, elementary particles, interacting with one another in particular ways according to the four fundamental laws of physics: electromagnetism, gravity, and the weak and strong nuclear forces. Of course, other physicalist theories take things in a slightly different direction: string theory, for instance, assumes that instead of being made up of zero-dimensional (point-like) elementary particles, reality is made up of one dimensional extended elementary entities (strings). (The advent of string theory is an attempt to reconcile the standard model of particle physics with the theory of general relativity).

Regardless of the theory, however, there is always an underlying presupposition in modern science–that the ultimate reality of the world is fundamentally physical.

According to this worldview, even that which appears non-physical, like thoughts, emotions, will, and other psychological (i.e., mental) phenomena, is ultimately physical. In other words, according to physicalism, even our consciousnesses (our individual minds) must themselves, ultimately be explained in terms of the physical.

This, however, is the problem with physicalism. Contrary to popular opinion, consciousness cannot be adequately explained in terms of the physical.

The Problem with Physicalism

Consciousness ≠ Brain States

Let me phrase my argument as succinctly as possible: no physical description of the brain (or for that matter, of the molecular constituent stuff that makes up the neurons of the brain, or even a complicated description of all the subtle chemical reactions occurring within and between each neuron) no mater how exhaustive, will ever suffice to explain why consciousness emerges from matter.

Put simply: no possible description of a neuron, a synaptic connection, or a brain wave, or the chemical processes occurring within and between neurons, will ever equal the (conscious/mental) experience of the colour blue.

Let the following expression summarize my claim: The physical stuff of the brain ≠ the experiential content of the mind. Neurological systems of interaction and complexity ≠ the (conscious/mental) experience of seeing the colour blue.

The following video recapitulates the main message I am trying to get across.

First Objection: “Brain Causes Mind”

At this point, an endorser of physicalism might concede that the brain and mind are distinct. A neurological synaptic connection does not identically equal the experience of the colour blue.

However, the supporter of physicalism might nevertheless stress the following: “just because brain states are not identical to mental states does not mean that the brain does not cause the mind.”

In other words, the objection in question reads as such: a mental state is still ultimately explainable in terms of brain states, because brains states cause mental states (i.e., insofar as the brain causes the mind, the brain explains the mind. Since the brain is a physical thing, this means a physical things explains the mind. Therefore, physicalism is true). That is, although “mental states” can be defined in a distinct manner from “brain states,” “brain states” are still ultimately the thing(s) doing the explanatory heavy-lifting of accounting for the existence of mental states. And since the “brain state” is a physical thing, that means the “mental state,” is still ultimately explained away by physicalism via causal explanation.

Let me break down the argument into its premises:

• P1: A causal relationship is an explanatory relationship. [Assumption]
• P2: The brain is a physical thing. [Assumption]
• P3: Physicalism is defined as a theory which ascribes explanatory ultimacy to the physical. [Definition]
• P4: The brain causes the mind. [Assumption]
• C1: Therefore, the brain explains the mind. [P1, P4]
• C2: Therefore, a physical thing explains the mind. [P2, C1]
• C3: Therefore, physicalism is true. [C2, P3]

Response to First Objection

My strategy for responding to this objection is to attack the fourth premise, which states that “the brain causes the mind.”

If I attack this premise, then every other subsequent premise collapses, since every other premise is built upon reference to this premise.

My rationale for critiquing the fourth premise is to appeal to the axiom: “correlation ≠ causation.”

No one denies that brain states correlate with mental states. However, there is no logical principle in virtue of which we can justify an assumption that correlation of any sort between the brain the mind, in and of itself, is sufficient to imply causation between the brain and the mind. This means that though we must accept that the brain is strongly correlated with mental activity, correlation alone cannot justify an assumption that the brain is the cause of mental activity.

So where does that leave us? Well, it leaves us with a variety of equally plausible alternatives:

1. The brain causes the mind and/or the mind is a process of the brain. This position is seen in physicalism/materialism.
2. The brain is parallelistically synchronous with the mind, and vice versa (but neither causes the other). This view is called “parallelism,” and can be seen in (neutral monist versions of) property dualism.
3. The brain is caused by the mind and/or the brain is a process of the mind. This position is seen in Idealism.

Objection Two: “Brain-Causation is the Best Explanation Available”

The supporter of physicalism will insist that “1.” is the best alternative.

The supporter of physicalism will articulate their position as such: we have no good reason to assume that the brain is not the cause of the mind (i.e., only contrarianism or inordinate scepticism keeps us away from making the most common sense assumption that the brain, which correlates with the mind, correlates with the mind so much precisely because it causes the mind).

Response to the Second Objection

I sympathize with the sentiment above, but my response is clear: we do have good reason to doubt that the brain causes the mind.

The reason is that there is no grounds on which we can postulate why matter could ever produce and/or cause something as utterly distinct in kind from itself as mind. That is, as long as we acknowledge the obvious difference between the purely physical realities of the brain (neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters, etc.) and the purely qualitative realm of experience (the experience of the taste of syrup, or the experience of the colour blue, or the experience of harsh headache pains, etc.) there is no grounds on which we can make the conceptual leap from nonconscious matter to conscious matter.

In other words, the reason for discarding the view that the brain causes the mind is found in “The Hard Problem of Consciousness.”

The Hard Problem of Consciousness

The Hard Problem of Consciousness can be described as the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. In other words, “how does Matter make the leap from nonconscious to consciousness?” Why should matter give way to consciousness? How does the brain, which in itself is made up of non-conscious constituent matter, create the phenomenon of consciousness? How does the public, objective, quantitative material world lead to the realm of the private, subjective, qualitative experiences?

Many people are inclined to try explain away consciousness in terms of neurological complexities. Many people think that a brain arranged in a certain way, activated in a certain manner, leads to consciousness. In other words, many people are inclined to “explain away” the Hard Problem of Consciousness by dismissing consciousness as an emergent property, as if though somehow saying the words “emergent property,” could reconcile the irreconcilable differences between Matter and Mind.

Why, after all, should a certain arrangement and/or configuration of brain matter lead to consciousness? How does any amount or complexity of nonconscious constituent matter ever manifest consciousness?

There is, in short, an emergence problem at work here. How does consciousness emerge from non-consciousness?

Emergence Problem: Analysis

Fundamentally, emergence is a matter of complexity arising from simplicity. It is phenomenon in which the whole makes up something greater than the sum of its parts; it is the phenomenon in which constituent simplicities make-up an aggregate whole which exhibits properties which were not present within any of the individual things which made up the whole.

Supporters of physicalism are often inclined to cite emergence as a way by which Matter causes the Mind. That is, much like singular non-intelligent ants make up the complex intelligent system of an anthill, physicalists assume that non-conscious neurons collectively make up a conscious entity. What consciousness is to neurons, an anthill is to its ants, or so the physicalist would be inclined to argue.

However, I am here to say that this is dis-analogy. The phenomenon of complexity is not comparable to the phenomenon of consciousness.

Why? Because complexity is something which can be exhaustively described and explained in terms of the physical, namely the conjunction of 1. simple starting conditions and 2. rules of interaction (and, 3. time). Complexity is the function of simple constituent stuff interacting in certain ways, according to certain rules, over time. Complexity does not come from nowhere other than the very potential contained in the physical environment in which it occurs–it’s not magic.

Perhaps the best illustration of my point about complexity is the “the game of life.” The “game of life” is a “cellular automaton.” It is a computer game which simulates cellular reproduction with a few simple starting conditions.

The screen in which the game is played consists of a grid of cells. Each cell can either have one of two conditions: it can either be populated or unpopulated. Unpopulated cells are white, populated cells are coloured black. On top of this basic information there are four fundamental rules which guide all other interactions: 1. Each cell with one or no neighbours dies, as if by solitude 2. Each cell with four or more neighbours dies, as if by overpopulation 3. Each cell with two or three neighbours survives 4. Each cell with three of more neighbours becomes populated. A player can begin the game by populating any number of cells they choose. After, the player can click “start,” and launch the simulation. Thereafter, the game plays itself, according to its rules and the initial starting conditions the player chose.

Not infrequently, even very simple starting conditions can result in startlingly complex systems which are self-perpetuating and sustainable, not unalike homeostatic organic systems (like anthills).

As you can see, therefore, complexity very easily emerges from simplicity. The emergence of complexity from simple starting conditions can be easily accounted for within the very starting conditions of the game. The leap from simplicity to complexity simply requires one factor: rules of interaction which guide the conduct of simple starting conditions over time. Simplicity + rules + time = complexity. There is nothing in this equation which exists outside of the material universe. It is a process which can be exhaustively described according to the purely physical.

Complexity, therefore, is continuum (i.e., complexity exists everywhere in Nature, in the form of potential). Wherever there are starting conditions of any sort, and rules by which those conditions interact with each other and progress over time, there is already the potential for complexity. The potential for complexity, means that it is already fully accounted for (i.e., all the ingredients are there for complexity to emerge, with the exception of time which hasn’t carried the potential to actuality).

Therefore, the emergence of complexity is not a brute (unexplained) fact. Complexity doesn’t come from nowhere, it is already pre-existing everywhere. An ant may only have a low-level of complexity, but enough low-level complexity eventually amounts to high level-complexity.

In contrast, consciousness is binary–either it is present or it is not. No individual neuron possesses a qualitative, phenomenal, experiential inner life, therefore no amount of neurons can come together to create qualitative, phenomenal, experiential inner life.

Unlike complexity, consciousness cannot be exhaustively described or explained in terms of the physical. No amount of starting conditions or rules of interaction or time can cause or lead to the emergence of an experiential, phenomenal, qualitative inner life.

In order to demonstrate my point I want to invoke the following thought experiment: the China Brain thought experiment. This thought experiment asks us to consider what would happen if each member of the nation of China were asked to simulate the actions of one neuron. Each citizen would use telephones to simulate the axons and dendrites that connect neurons. The question, therefore is simple: would this China Brain have a consciousness of its own? Would the aggregate of all Chinese citizens acting as one neuron each, all interacting with one another, create a Mind?

Intuitively, the answer is no, and this suggests that though our brains’ correlate with Mind, they do not cause Mind, because if they did cause Mind, then any sufficiently complex system that functions similar to a brain elsewhere in nature would also possess consciousness–and yet this does not strike us as true. (let me clear: I’m not saying intuitions are infallible, but I am saying that the very intuition that undergirds physicalist theories of mind [where the physical causes the mental] is an intuition which would imply that the Chinese Brain would have consciousness, and many of the people who support physicalism don’t immediately find the implications of the Chinese Brain experiment intuitive. Therefore, the point of the experiment is to put the intuitions of physicalist at odds with themselves, in order to reveal an inner contradiction in the physicalist’s attitudes. The physicalist, of course, can bite the bullet and say that the Chinse Brain would instantiate the property of consciousness).

Emergence Problem: Conclusion

Regardless, it seems to me that whereas complexity is a function of simple starting conditions and certain rules being applied over time, consciousness is an irreducible fact in-and-of-itself which cannot be accounted for merely from complexity.

Physicalists may inclined to argue that many unanswered questions of the past were answered by science, and consciousness will be no different. This, seems to me, however, to be an inordinate amount of faith to put in the power of science to explain away all mysteries. Please tell me, what possible process could science ever discover that would give us a definitive link between the inner lives that we all have and the material world of inanimate physical stuff.

Ultimately, in my understanding, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, amounts to an emergence problem of consciousness. That is, there is no linking, no bridging principle, which can grant us the leap from matter to mind.

There is nothing short of a fundamentally irreducible ontological chasm between the material and mental. That which is purely quantitative can never yield that which is qualitative.

Objection Three: Consciousness is an Illusion

In response to all of this the supporter of physicalism might be inclined to respond as such: “the hard problem of consciousness would pose a difficulty, if we accepted the premise that consciousness is indeed a real thing in need of explanation. However, consciousness is not a real thing in need of explanation, because consciousness is only an illusion.”

In other words, the supporter of physicalism might end up saying: there is no need to explain how matter causes mind, because mind is not even a real entity.

This is a position which is embraced by certain eliminativist materialists and/or illusionists.

Response to Objection Three

This one is mind-blowingly simple: if consciousness is an illusion, to whom is it an illusion?

That something is an illusion, implies that there is some subject of knowledge (i.e., a consciousness) for which it is an illusion. Therefore, the argument that consciousness is an illusion defeats itself.

Alternatively, that something is an illusion is in itself a belief, and all beliefs presuppose believers. A believer, however, can only be a believer if there is a conscious possession of belief (i.e., belief implies consciousness). Therefore, the argument that consciousness is an illusion is in itself a belief which presupposes consciousness.

A more technical way of phrasing this argument is as such: the position of illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness (qualitative experiences for which there is a what-it-is-likeness) is an illusion. However, the very claim that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion has a what-it-is-likeness to it (i.e., there is something for which it is like to possess the belief that what-it-is-likeness is an illusion). Therefore, the very belief defeats itself, because it presupposes the very thing it claims to reject.

Regardless of how you look at it, the objection defeats itself, because of course it does.

Consciousness (your individual consciousness, in particular) is the most obvious thing in existence, everything else is theory. Think back to Descartes: “I think, therefore I am.”

Consciousness is the most obvious thing in existence, anyone who denies it is a fool.

The fact that there are academics our there who genuinely deny the existence of consciousness recalls the following quote to mind: “Some ideas are so stupid that only intellectuals believe them.”

So What’s the Solution?

The hard problem of consciousness posits a seemingly insoluble explanatory gap between the brain and the mind. This, in turn, diminishes the plausibility of a causal relationship between the brain and the mind.

Solution “1.” seems defunct, in virtue of its failure to account for its own position on the brain-mind relationship.

This leaves us with solutions 2-3 as the only possible alternatives left over.

Position 2 represents property dualism (of course not all versions of this position necessarily advocates for parallelism). For instance, Baruch Spinoza is an example of a philosopher who subscribed to parallelism and a neutral monist property dualism.

Position 3, basically constitutes a position of idealism, a philosophical position that has a long history in Western Philosophy, from Plato, to Kant, to Schopenhauer, and many others, and has an even longer history in Eastern Philosophy.

In the next post, I will be exploring the solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, by deconstructing alternatives 2 and 3, and advocating for position 3.